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Abstract 
Basel III responded to the financial crisis by redefining and expanding the capital 
requirements for risk-weighted assets and by proposing the introduction of a leverage 
ratio which sets a minimum level of capital for banks in relation to total exposures. The 
capital requirement is being increased primarily through the active use of 
macroprudential capital buffers. As a result, it was proposed that the leverage ratio 
requirement should also take into account the level of capital buffers and thus become a 
macroprudential policy tool. This article examines the relationship between capital and 
leverage ratios and discusses the options for, and effects of, introducing a 
macroprudential leverage ratio. We find that the capital and leverage ratios complement 
each other and that the introduction of a macroprudential leverage ratio could, under 
certain circumstances, enhance the effectiveness of a macroprudential policy. 
1. Introduction 
The general objective of capital regulation is to increase banks’ resilience to 
unpredictable losses and to ensure that any losses they do incur are borne by their 
owners. This should ultimately curb risky behaviour by banks and hence reduce the 
likelihood of crises in the banking sector. Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) 
and Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) extend capital regulation to include 
macroprudential capital buffers, application of which increases the banking sector’s 
resilience to systemic risks. However, experience has shown that capital level based 
on risk-weighted assets may not be a sufficient guarantee of stability if the banking 
sector is excessively leveraged. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
therefore came up with the concept of the leverage ratio. It abstracts from the various 
credit risk levels of different asset classes and links Tier 1 capital to total exposures, 
comprising total assets plus selected off-balance-sheet items.  
In late 2010, the BCBS recommended a methodology for calculating the 
leverage ratio.1 The BCBS preliminarily set the minimum ratio (referred to here as 
the microprudential leverage ratio) at 3%, which limits the leverage of total 
                                                          
1 The rules were later revised and are described in detail in BIS (2016a). 
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exposures to 33.3 times Tier 1 capital. European Banking Authority (EBAa, 2016) 
states, that the 3% level of calibration for the microprudential leverage ratio is 
appropriate for the EU banking sector. The microprudential leverage ratio is not a 
binding regulatory tool at the moment. However, the EU aims to make the leverage 
ratio a binding regulatory and supervisory tool as from 2018 (recitals 93–96 of the 
CRR). 
There have also been proposals that the leverage ratio requirement should take 
into account the level of capital buffers and thus become a macroprudential policy 
tool. The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) mentions a macroprudential 
leverage ratio2 as a possible instrument for preventing excessive credit growth and 
leverage in one of its recommendations (ESRB, 2013) and describes it in more detail 
in ESRB (2015).  
This article deals with the relationship between the leverage and capital ratios 
and the role of the leverage ratio in capital regulation of the banking sector.3 We 
begin by examining the nature of, and relationship between, the leverage and capital 
ratios. We then describe a possible setting of the macroprudential leverage ratio and 
its effect on the effectiveness of macroprudential policy. We go on to analyze the 
relationships between the two tools and selected financial indicators using data for 
groups of Czech banks in 2002–2015. We end by assessing the impact of the level of, 
and changes to, risk weights and macroeconomic conditions on the leverage and 
capital ratios. The key contribution of the study is to find out the possible 
complementary relationship between already exiting capital ratio and the newly 
proposed leverage ratio. 
Table 1 Terms relating to capital regulation tools 
Capital ratio Ratio of capital to total risk exposures that bank actually holds (in %) 
Minimum capital ratio Ratio of regulatory minimum capital to total risk exposures (in %) 
Macroprudential capital 
buffers 
Add-ons to minimum capital ratio depending on evolution of systemic risk (in %) 
Total capital ratio Sum of minimum capital ratio and macroprudential capital buffers (in %) 
Leverage ratio Ratio of Tier 1 capital to total exposures that bank actually holds (in %) 
Microprudential 
leverage ratio 
Minimum prescribed leverage ratio (in %) 
Macroprudential 
leverage ratio 
Add-on to leverage ratio above its microprudential level depending on evolution 
of systemic risk (in %) 
Total leverage ratio Sum of microprudential and macroprudential leverage ratios (in %) 
Capital requirement Absolute amount of capital implied by total capital or leverage ratio (in CZK) 
Capitalization Absolute amount of capital that bank actually holds (in CZK) 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
  
                                                          
2 It has been introduced into national legislation for example in the UK (BoE, 2015). 
3 This article does not set out to recommend a calibration or form of legislation for the leverage ratio. 
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2. The relationship between the capital and leverage ratios 
Neither the form nor the calibration of the leverage ratio as a binding 
regulatory tool has been set definitively yet. The examples given in this article 
therefore serve to illustrate the importance of the leverage ratio as a supplementary 
tool in capital regulation of the banking sector and are based on the preliminary form 
described in ESRB (2015). Table 1 summarizes the terms used in this article relating 
to the two capital regulation tools.4 
2.1 The capital ratio and the leverage ratio 
The capital ratio is a capital regulation tool that reflects the riskiness of 
assets. It is based on the capital requirement,5 which is a function of the regulatory 
minimum capital ratio, the amount of assets and the risk weights of the relevant asset 
classes: 
/RWRRWR K RWA , 
(1) 
RWA RW TA  , (2) 
which gives this formula for the capital requirement: 
 RWRK RW TA RWR   , (3) 
where RWR is the total capital ratio (%), RWRK is the capital requirement 
implied by the total capital ratio, RWA  are risk-weighted assets, RW is the average 
risk weight across all asset classes and TA are total assets. 
The main advantage of the capital ratio is that it takes into account the 
riskiness of assets. A bank that invests in higher-risk assets, which are generally 
associated with higher returns, should hold more capital than one that invests in less 
risky assets. CRD IV allows risk weights – and hence the riskiness of an asset – to be 
determined using either a standardized approach (STA) or an internal rating based 
approach (IRB). Banks applying the STA approach determine risk weights according 
to values laid down by law,6 whereas those using the IRB approach determine them 
using internal models. The main risk characteristics which determine the risk weights 
                                                          
4 These terms are for reference only and should not be taken as binding, as some of them have yet to be 
incorporated into legislation because the regulatory process is still ongoing. 
5In this article we do not concern ourselves with the capital requirements for market risk and operational 
risk, which are based on other types of risks than credit risk. This is a simplification, as we work solely 
with the capital requirement for credit risk, which accounted for 87% of the total capital requirement as of 
30 September 2015. We also use total risk exposures rather than risk-weighted exposures. 
6Under the STA approach, the asset class, its external rating and any collateral are taken into account when 
determining the risk weight. As of the end of 2015, the STA approach was being used to determine risk 
weights for 29% of total exposures (FSR 2015/2016, pp. 46), so the IRB approach to determining credit 
risk was dominant. 
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in banks’ IRB models are the probability of default of the credit exposure (PD) and 
the loss given default (LGD).7 
The IRB approach is generally used to measure credit risk by large banks. Its 
advantages include greater sensitivity of the capital requirement to the risk structure 
of banks’ assets. It tends to produce a lower risk weight for a given asset class than 
the STA approach.8 Given the complexity of the IRB approach, therefore, concerns 
have been expressed about the risk of insufficiently strict models, or “model risk” 
(Leslé and Avramova, 2012). BIS (2016b) and EBA (2016b) show differences across 
banks in the RWA calculation, their consequences and propose legislative changes to 
the internal ratings-based approach. Aikman et al. (2014a) assert that financial 
systems are better characterized by existing uncertainty than by assessment of 
frequently unpredictable risk. For this reason, they believe that complex approaches 
should be complemented with simple yet comprehensive ones. The leverage ratio is 
an example of the latter. 
The leverage ratio is a function of Tier 1 capital and total exposures, 
comprising total assets plus selected off-balance-sheet items:9 
/LRLR K TE , (4) 
This gives the following capital requirement calculation: 
LRK TE LR  , (5) 
where LR is the total leverage ratio (%), LRK is the capital requirement implied 
by the total leverage ratio and TE are total exposures10 for the leverage ratio 
calculation. 
The leverage ratio is therefore a (currently non-binding) capital regulation tool 
that does not reflect the riskiness of assets. Experience with the consequences of the 
recent financial crisis has shown that banks can record large losses even on assets 
that are generally regarded as low risk and have been assigned the highest rating 
(securitised assets and government bonds). Such assets have low risk weights and the 
capital requirement for them is therefore relatively low. Furthermore, a change in 
balance-sheet structure towards such assets allows banks to lower their capital 
requirements. However, the leverage ratio tool sets the capital requirement regardless 
of the riskiness of assets and thus defines the minimum absolute capital requirement. 
The risk of insufficient capital can therefore be mitigated by setting it at the right 
level. Introducing the microprudential leverage ratio implies setting the maximum 
                                                          
7 Other variables enter the equation for the calculation of risk weights. For details, see Articles 153–154 of 
the CRR.. 
8 This is true for Czech banks (FSR 2014/2015, pp. 42–45). 
9 Besides total assets, total exposures partially include the values of derivatives and add-ons for 
counterparty credit risk of repurchase transactions, securities or commodities lending or borrowing 
transactions, long settlement transactions and margin lending transactions. Other off-balance-sheet items 
are adjusted by the relevant coefficient. For details, see BIS (2016a) or ESRB (2016a).  
10 To better explain the role of the leverage ratio in capital regulation, we abstract from off-balance-sheet 
exposures and use a simplified leverage ratio defined as the ratio of Tier 1 capital to total assets. In other 
words, we assume that total assets equal total exposures. 
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leverage level. Juselius and Drehmann (2015) state that leverage, together with debt 
burden, are the main drivers of the financial cycle. The main objective of introducing 
the leverage ratio is therefore to increase banks’ resilience to less likely losses due to 
credit risk and to reduce the probability and size of future financial crises. An 
improvement in financial stability thanks to the introduction of the leverage ratio is 
mentioned, for example, by Bair (2015) and Grill et al. (2015). 
Table 2 summarizes the pros and cons of the capital and leverage ratios11 and 
illustrates their complementary relationship, with the pros of one offsetting the 
cons of the other and vice versa. The leverage ratio to some extent mitigates the 
weaknesses of the capital ratio, such as modelling method complexity, model risk 
and procyclicality, which can lead to a lower capital requirement. Conversely, the 
capital ratio reduces the risk of funds being moved into riskier, higher-yield assets – a 
real risk if only the leverage ratio is in force. 
Setting a risk-weight floor in the IRB approach – currently under discussion in 
ongoing preparations to revise the approaches to determining risk weights (BIS, 
2016b) – would have a similar effect as introducing a microprudential leverage ratio. 
This option may be more appropriate where model risk or systemic risk is associated 
with a specific asset class or sector. However, if those risks cannot be ruled out for 
other asset classes and other sectors, it may be simpler and more effective to use a 
leverage ratio than set risk-weight floors for multiple asset classes (for details, see 
ESRB, 2015, pp. 23–25).  
Table 2 Terms relating to capital regulation tools 
Leverage 
ratio 
Pros 
(1) Increases resilience to less likely but highly correlated losses 
(2) Simple tool  
(3) Countercyclical 
Cons 
(1) Increases risk of transfer of assets into riskier, higher-yield assets 
(2) Can be major regulatory change for banks specializing in low-risk assets 
Capital 
ratio 
Pros 
(1) Reflects level of risk of assets and thus reduces incentive to allocate resources 
into riskier, higher-yield assets 
(2) Allows for more effective management of credit risk (IRB models) 
Cons 
(1) Reliant on risk assessment of all types of assets – model risk (IRB models) 
(2) Low capitalisation for less risky assets 
(3) Complex and insufficiently comparable 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
2.2 The constraining effect of the capital and leverage Ratios 
The complementary relationship between the two tools suggests that they 
have different effects on a banks’ capital requirement (see Table 3). To illustrate 
those different effects, we chose the same settings of the two tools as in ESRB 
                                                          
11 For details on the costs and benefits of introducing the leverage ratio, see Fender and Lewrick (2015). 
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(2015), i.e. a total capital ratio expressed in terms of Tier 1 capital12 of 8.5% (a 
minimum requirement of 6% plus a 2.5% capital conservation buffer13) and a 
microprudential leverage ratio of 3%. We then chose individual asset classes and 
corresponding regulatory risk weights based on the STA approach. The different 
effects of the leverage and capital ratios are clear from the last two columns of the 
table. A focus by banks on riskier assets is associated with a higher capital 
requirement based on the total capital ratio, whereas a focus on less risky assets is 
associated with a higher requirement based on the microprudential leverage ratio. 
Table 3 Minimum capital requirement given a microprudential leverage ratio of 3% 
and a risk-weighted capital requirement of 8.5% 
Asset class (100) 
STA regulatory risk 
weights of banks (in %) 
Capital 
Leverage ratio 
requirement 
Risk-weighted 
requirement 
Central governments 0 3.0 0.0 
Financial institutions 20 3.0 1.7 
Retail – mortgage 
loans 
35 3.0 3.0 
Retail – consumer 
loans 
75 3.0 6.4 
Corporate sector 100 3.0 8.5 
Notes: As an example, we chose an exposure of CZK 100,000 and assumed a microprudential leverage ratio 
of 3% and a minimum capital ratio of 8.5%. Using the formula for computing capital requirements, we 
calculated the capital requirements based on the leverage and capital ratios (last two columns, in CZK 
thousands). 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
It can be seen in Table 3 that, given relevant settings of the two tools, the 
microprudential leverage ratio (3%) leads to the same capital requirement 
(CZK 3,000) as the total capital ratio (8.5%) at an average risk weight of 35%. With 
the said settings of the two tools, a risk weight of 35% therefore represents the 
critical average risk weight (CARW), which we obtain by dividing the total leverage 
ratio by the total capital ratio (3/8.5).14 The CARW is therefore the average risk 
weight at which the bank is equally constrained by the two capital regulation tools, or 
at which the bank must maintain the same capital requirement to comply with both 
tools. 
/CARW LR RWR , (6) 
It also holds that 
 
                                                          
12 The leverage ratio is also expressed in terms of Tier 1 capital for now. 
13 Although the capital conservation buffer is commonly classed as a macroprudential tool, it is in essence 
a newly defined element of the traditional microprudential capital requirements. 
14 If we did not abstract from off-balance-sheet items for the leverage ratio, the equation would be: CARW 
= (LR/RWR)∙(TE/TA). 
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LR RWRK K ,  if CARW RW  (7) 
>LR RWRK K ,  if >CARW RW  (8) 
LR RWRK K ,  if CARW RW  (9) 
So, if both tools apply, banks will be constrained by at least one of them at 
any given moment in time, depending on which capital requirement is higher: that 
based on the leverage ratio or that based on the capital ratio. The constraining effect 
of the specific capital regulation tool depends, in addition to its setting, on banks’ 
business model or risk weights. Given the above settings of the two tools, if a bank 
has an average risk weight above 35%, it will be constrained by the capital ratio. 
Conversely, if the risk weight is below 35%, the leverage ratio will be constraining 
(see Figure 1). The CARW level therefore determines the constraining effect of the 
two tools. 
Figure 1 Constraining effect of the leverage and capital rations given a constant 
CARW 
 
Notes: LR denotes the total leverage ratio and RWR the total capital ratio. If the LR is identified as 
constraining, the bank must hold more capital under the leverage ratio requirement. If the RWR is 
constraining, it must hold more capital based on the regulatory capital ratio. The area denoted as 
binding is the area associated with a breach of the regulatory requirement in our illustrative example. 
Source: Fender and Lewrick (2015), compiled by authors. 
If changes in the settings of the two tools are equal in percentage terms, the 
CARW level will not change (see Figure 1 and the CARW expressed as a line). If 
they change differently, the CARW will also change. An increase in the total capital 
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ratio – for example in the form of the introduction of, or an increase in, 
macroprudential capital buffers – would lead to a decrease in the CARW and hence 
also in the constraining effect of the leverage ratio. Therefore, it has been proposed 
that the leverage ratio requirement should take into account the level of capital 
buffers and thus become a macroprudential policy tool. 
3. The macroprudential leverage ratio 
Macroprudential capital buffers usually fulfil two macroprudential policy 
objectives: to prevent misaligned incentives for financial institutions (structural 
dimension of systemic risk) and to prevent excessive credit growth and leverage 
(cyclical dimension of systemic risk). In this section, we will look at possible ways of 
linking them to the macroprudential leverage ratio and its objective. We will 
therefore assume that the microprudential leverage ratio is in force as a capital 
regulation tool. 
3.1 The structural and countercyclical macroprudential leverage ratios 
To mitigate the structural dimension of systemic risk, CRD IV allows the 
application of a broadly defined systemic risk buffer (SRB). This buffer is currently 
usually applied to systemically important institutions and has the same objective as 
those for global and other systemically important institutions (G-SIIs and O-SIIs 
respectively).15 These buffers are meant to increase the resilience of systemically 
important institutions, whose failure could impair the stability of the entire financial 
system. ESRB (2015) describes the option of linking the above buffers to a 
“structural macroprudential leverage ratio”, the application of which would 
simultaneously increase the total leverage ratio. 
In periods of excessive credit growth and leverage, which are associated with 
an elevated risk of future losses, CRD IV provides the application of a 
countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB).16  The objective of the CCyB is to reduce the 
risk of excessive credit growth and the effect of the cycle on capital requirements. In 
booms, the risk weights of IRB banks17 can move procyclically (Aikman et al., 
2014b) due to procyclicality in the components used to calculate them, as PD and 
LGD (see section 2 of this article) are derived from measures18 that tend to be lower 
in booms and higher in recessions. Given the recurring expansion and contraction 
phases of the economic and financial cycle, the economy can be expected to slow 
after a period of strong growth.19 The CCyB is therefore applied during a boom so it 
can later be released during a contraction. This should lead to greater resilience of 
banks and lower amplitude of the credit cycle. ESRB (2015) describes the option of 
linking the CCyB to a “countercyclical macroprudential leverage ratio”. Brei and 
                                                          
15SRB is governed by Article 133 of the CRD and the G-SII and O-SII buffers by Article 131 of the CRD. 
16CCyB is governed by Article 136 of the CRD. 
17At the moment, procyclical movement in the components of risk weights can pose a risk to IRB banks. If 
risk triggers are introduced in the STA approach (BIS, 2015) a similar risk could apply to STA banks. 
18PD is derived from the ratio of NPLs to total loans in the investment portfolio and LGD from the rate of 
recovery of a given NPL. 
19In a contraction phase of the financial cycle, by contrast, PD, LGD and hence also risk weights tend to be 
overestimated even though they are often falling due to investments being moved into less risky assets. 
This could constrain lending activity and hinder economic recovery. 
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Gambacorta (2014) find that the leverage ratio is a more countercyclical capital 
regulation tool than the capital ratio. 
3.2 The setting of the macroprudential leverage ratio 
(i) The impact of (non-)introduction of the macroprudential leverage 
ratio 
In section 2 we followed the lead of the ESRB (2015) by using a CARW of 
35%. However, the CARW can vary depending on the settings of the total leverage 
and capital ratios (see Table 4). The CARW is lowered among other things by the 
introduction of a macroprudential capital buffers without simultaneous introduction 
of a macroprudential leverage ratio. This lowers the risk weight indicating the 
minimum absolute capital requirement and reduces the constraining effect of the 
leverage ratio. 
If, for example, the SRB is introduced for systemically important institutions 
and the structural macroprudential leverage ratio is not simultaneously activated, the 
CARW for those institutions will decrease, because the total capital ratio will rise 
while the total leverage ratio will remain unchanged. The CARW will thus be lower 
and the leverage ratio less constraining for systemically important institutions than 
for the rest of the sector. Conversely, if the structural macroprudential leverage ratio 
is introduced simultaneously, the total leverage ratio will be higher and the maximum 
leverage level lower for systemically important institutions than for the rest of the 
sector. 
Table 4 Effects of the setting of the total capital ratio on the CARW (%) 
Items included in total 
capital ratio 
Total capital ratio Microprudential 
leverage ratio 
CARW 
Minimum capital ratio (MCP) 6.0 3.0 50 
MCP+CCoB 8.5 3.0 35 
MCP+CCoB+CCyB 11.0 3.0 27 
MCP+ CCoB+CCyB+SRB 14 3.0 21 
Notes: MCP = Minimum capita ratio (Tier 1), Tier 1 = the highest quality of regulatory capital; CCoB = capital 
conservation buffer; CCyB = countercyclical capital buffer; SRB = systemic risk buffer. 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
If the countercyclical macroprudential leverage ratio is not activated at the 
same time as the CCyB, the constraining effect of the leverage ratio will decrease 
during an expansion phase of the financial cycle. The risk weight indicating the 
minimum absolute capital requirement will fall as the CARW decreases. Conversely, 
if the countercyclical macroprudential leverage ratio is simultaneously applied, the 
maximum leverage level will fall in an expansion phase of the financial cycle. 
A rise in the macroprudential capital buffers without a corresponding increase 
in the macroprudential leverage ratio therefore always leads to a fall in the CARW 
and a decrease in the constraining effect of the leverage ratio. If, despite the fall in 
the CARW, the average risk weight remains lower than the CARW for some banks, 
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an increase in the macroprudential capital buffers will not have a constraining effect 
on those banks. The capital requirement based on the microprudential leverage ratio 
would remain higher than the capital requirement based on the total capital ratio (see 
section 2.2). These banks would thus continue to be constrained by the 
microprudential leverage ratio, and their capital requirement would not take into 
account the increase in systemic risk. The introduction of the macroprudential 
leverage ratio could therefore have a positive effect on the attainment of 
macroprudential policy objectives, especially in a situation where systemic risk is 
rising and the risk weights of banks with significant market shares are below the 
CARW. This is because the macroprudential leverage ratio has a similar objective as 
the macroprudential capital buffers, the only difference being that it constrains banks 
with risk weights below the CARW, on which macroprudential capital buffers do not 
have a constraining effect. 
According to ESRB (2015), for the purposes of setting the macroprudential 
leverage ratio it is possible to make some changes to it in line with the evolution of 
systemic risk or to apply a fixed rule that automatically keeps the CARW constant 
over time, which implies a constant constraining effect of the two capital regulation 
tools. In other words, they can use a fixed rule to ensure that the risk weight 
indicating the minimum capital requirement does not change.  
We will not deal any further with minor adjustments to the macroprudential 
leverage ratio, as they can differ from case to case. We will concentrate on clarifying 
how the fixed rule is applied. 
(ii) The setting of the macroprudential leverage ratio using the fixed rule 
with an initial CARW of 35% 
We start with the example of setting the countercyclical macroprudential 
leverage ratio20 using a fixed rule keeping the CARW constant at 35%. Then we look 
at the effect of a different initial CARW on the macroprudential leverage ratio when 
the fixed rule is applied.  
Figures 2a and 2b depict three different scenarios, all of them continuing to 
assume a microprudential leverage ratio of 3% and a total capital ratio of 8.5%. In the 
initial scenario A, macroprudential buffers are not added to the total capital ratio and 
the CARW is therefore 35% (3/8.5). In scenarios B and C, the maximum CCyB of 
2.5% is introduced. However, these scenarios differ in the introduction of the 
countercyclical macroprudential leverage ratio. In scenario B, the macroprudential 
leverage ratio is not introduced and the total leverage ratio remains at 3%. The 
CARW therefore falls to 27% (moving from point A to point B in Figure 2b). With 
this shift, the constraining effect of the capital ratio increases at the expense of that of 
the leverage ratio. In scenario C, the 2.5% CCyB is incorporated into the total 
leverage ratio so that the CARW stays constant at 35% (the fixed rule mentioned 
above). The total leverage ratio therefore rises to 3.9%, while the countercyclical 
macroprudential leverage ratio is 0.9% (point C in Figure 2b). As the CARW is kept 
constant, the constraining effect of the two capital regulation tools remains the same 
as before the introduction of the CCyB. By definition, however, the minimum capital 
                                                          
20 The situation is more complicated for the structural macroprudential leverage ratio, as it only applies to 
certain institutions. 
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requirement increases and conversely the maximum possible leverage for banks 
decreases as the total leverage ratio rises. 
Figure 2 Effect of introducing a macroprudential leverage ratio on the CARW and the 
constraining effect of the two capital regulation tools 
a) b) 
 
 
Source: Authors' calculations. 
(iii) The effect of the CARW level on the macroprudential leverage ratio 
when the fixed rule is applied 
When the fixed rule is applied, the initial CARW level has an effect on the 
macroprudential leverage ratio in addition to the setting of the constraining effect of 
the two tools, as it holds that: 
LR CARW RWR   , (10) 
where LR  is the change in the total leverage ratio and RWRa  is the 
change in the total capital ratio. 
Table 5 Effects of the minimum capital requirement level on the CARW and the 
macroprudential leverage ratio 
Items 
included in 
total 
capital 
ratio 
Total 
capital 
ratio 
Microprudential 
leverage ratio 
C
ARW 
Macroprudential leverage ratio 
CCyB = 2.5 
% 
SRB = 3 % 
CCoB = 
2.5% 
MCP 6.0 3.0 50 1.3 1.5 1.3 
MCP+CCoB 8.5 3.0 35 0.9 1.1 - 
Notes: MCP = Minimum capital ratio (Tier 1), Tier 1 = the highest quality of regulatory capital, CCoB = capital 
conservation buffer, CCyB = countercyclical capital buffer, SRB = systemic risk buffer. The 
macroprudential leverage ratio, given in the final three columns of the table, is computed as the CARW 
multiplied by the relevant macroprudential capital buffer. 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
The initial CARW can be in our example 35% or 50% (see Table 5), which, 
for example, given the introduction of the maximum CCyB and keeping the CARW 
constant, leads to a macroprudential leverage ratio in the range of 0.9%–1.3%. 
8.5%
11.0% 11.0%
3.0% 3.0%
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4. Empirical analysis21 
In this section, we first illustrate the relationship between the two capital tools 
and selected financial indicators for medium-sized and large banks22 in the Czech 
Republic in the period 2002–2015. Some banks started to migrate to the IRB 
approach to measuring credit risk in the second half of 2007 (shown by a vertical line 
in Figures 3a and 3b). Given the significant role of risk weights, we then use a simple 
vector autoregression model (VAR) followed by an impulse response analysis to 
assess the different impacts of the changes of risk weights on the leverage and capital 
ratios. Then we assess the impacts of the changes of macroeconomic conditions on 
both capital tools. 
Figure 3 Indicators relating to capital regulation – large and medium-sized banks 
a) Large banks (in %) b) Medium-sized banks (in %) 
  
Notes: The vertical line denotes the start of gradual migration to the IRB approach to measuring credit risk, 
which concerned all large banks and some medium-sized banks and building societies (in the majority 
of their portfolios). All small banks, however, still use the STA approach. 
Source: CNB. 
The data are not available in a long enough time series for us to compute the 
denominator of the leverage ratio. In what follows, therefore, we use a simplified 
leverage ratio calculated as the simple ratio of Tier 1 capital to total assets (instead of 
total exposures), i. e. excluding off-balance-sheet items. Czech banks are currently 
characterized by a relatively conservative business model focusing on lending to non-
financial corporations and providing loans for house purchase. The Czech banking 
sector’s off-balance sheet is therefore relatively small, justifying the above 
simplification. Risk weights are calculated as the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total 
                                                          
21 We use internal data for Czech banking sector provided by Czech National bank. 
22 We divide banks into large banks, medium-sized banks, small banks and building societies in 
accordance with the methodology in force at the end of 2015. We therefore classify banks by size 
according to their total assets. Large banks have total assets of over CZK 250 billion, medium-sized 
banks total assets of CZK 50–250 billion and small banks total assets of less than CZK 50 billion. 
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assets. Output gap is calculated by purely statistical Hodrick-Prescott filter with
1600 . Real interest rate is the 3M PRIBOR deflated by GDP deflator, which is 
also used for calculation of real exchange rate. For the sake of simplicity and up-to-
date data availability we use CZK/EUR due to prevailing eurozone export exposition 
of Czech economy. Further the trend values are extracted by Hodrick-Prescott filter 
and the gap is used for capturing change in monetary conditions.  Data are in 
quarterly frequencies. Financial indicators are downloaded from CNB internal data 
stock and from CNB and Eurostat official database. 
Figures 3a and 3b illustrate the evolution of the leverage and capital ratios, 
risk weights and ratio of loans to total assets on the example of medium-sized and 
large banks. The risk weights are affected by the asset structure, which changes over 
time as a result of change not only in the ratio of loans to total assets, but also in the 
credit portfolio structure. However, the financial indicators used in the figures do not 
capture change in the credit portfolio structure. In the case of the IRB approach, the 
risk weights are also affected by the cyclicality of the components used to calculate 
them (especially PD; see sections 2.1 and 3.1 of this article). It is apparent from 
Figures 3a and 3b that the risk weights started falling simultaneously with the switch 
to the IRB approach. In the case of medium-sized banks, this change and the 
subsequent decline can be partly explained by a fall in the ratio of loans to total 
assets and a rise in the ratio of less risky mortgage loans to total loans. The ratio of 
loans for property purchase to total loans has increased by 17.0 pp in medium-sized 
banks and 9.7 pp in large banks since 2007. The ratio of loans to total assets in large 
banks has meanwhile tended to rise. The fall in risk weights can be therefore 
explained solely by a change in asset structure, so migration to the IRB approach also 
played a role (see Figures 3a and 3b). 
4.1 The effect of the risk weight on the relationship between the capital and 
leverage ratios 
In section 2.2 we stated that the CARW level determines the intensity of 
effect of the individual capital regulation tools in the banking sector. By comparing 
the CARW and the average risk weights, we can determine which of the capital 
regulation tools has a constraining effect on a specific bank. 
For the purposes of explaining the relationship between the leverage and 
capital ratios, we have so far worked with a CARW of 35%, as in ESRB (2015). At 
this CARW level, the leverage ratio would represent a constraint for building 
societies in the Czech Republic, as for this type of bank the capital requirement based 
on the leverage ratio would be higher than that based on the capital ratio over the 
entire period under review (see Figure 4). However, a substantial decline in risk 
weights is visible for all the other types of banks in recent years as well. Risk weights 
have declined especially in case of small banks, because there has been most 
significant change in the balance-sheet structures towards less risky assets (share of 
loans to total assets declined from 92 % in 2007 to 52 % in 2015 - CNB, internal 
data). 
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Table 6 Data statistics 
Variables Mnemonics Mean Std. Dev. 
Jarque-
Bera 
ADF 
output gap CZ og -0,27934 2,05645 22,248*** -2,97542** 
output gap EA og_ea -0,11340 1,33848 10,132*** -3,77231** 
real exchange rate gap rer -0,35725 2,84042 68,082*** -3,14279** 
real interest rate gap rir 0,00386 0,01256 201,747*** -4,57140*** 
capital ratio - large banks cap_ratio 0,01533 0,32824 1389,225*** -12,0543*** 
leverage ratio - large banks lev_ratio 0,01212 0,15027 453,946*** -13,3330*** 
risk weighted assets to assets - large 
banks 
rwa_ta 0,00474 1,04098 1439,246*** -3,58833*** 
loans to assets - large banks credit_ta 0,03319 1,33627 1299,416*** -15,3263*** 
capital ratio - medium-sized banks cap_ratio -0,01155 0,53153 195,600*** -14,9643*** 
leverage ratio - medium-sized banks lev_ratio 0,00808 0,37060 979,281*** -17,2888** 
risk weighted assets to assets - medium-
sized banks 
rwa_ta 0,06585 1,47106 10362,34*** -5,89309*** 
loans to assets - medium-siezed banks credit_ta 0,06203 2,63779 19,206*** -16,7847*** 
capital ratio - building societies cap_ratio 0,00458 0,38016 2977,645*** -14,2088*** 
leverage ratio - building societies lev_ratio 0,00262 0,06987 76,883*** -6,01085** 
risk weighted assets to assets - building 
societies 
rwa_ta -0,02281 0,97733 77771,08*** -15,0589*** 
loans to assets - building societies credit_ta 0,12081 1,19439 1926,194*** -12,4063*** 
Source: CNB, data on Eurozone GDP were obtained from Eurostat. 
Figure 4 Risk weights for bank types in the Czech Republic (in %) 
 
Notes: The average risk weight is calculated as the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total assets. The thick 
horizontal line denotes a CARW of 35%. 
Source: CNB. 
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Figure 5 depicts the risk weights and leverage ratios for specific banks. One 
bank would currently be non-compliant with a microprudential leverage ratio of 3%. 
If we were to take into account the setting of the macroprudential leverage ratio in 
the scenario highlighted in Table 5 (as also used by ESRB, 2015), i.e. a maximum 
countercyclical component of 0.9% and a structural component of 1.1%, another one 
bank would be non-compliant with the maximum total leverage ratio. For those two 
institutions and another two building societies, the leverage ratio would be 
constraining, as their risk weight is below 35%. 
Figure 5 Leverage ratios and risk weights across banks as of 30 September 2015 (y-
axis: leverage ratio in %) 
 
Notes: In this case, the leverage ratio calculation includes the effect of the off-balance sheet. Squared dots 
depict systemically important banks, round dots small banks and diamond dots medium-sized banks 
and triangle dots building societies. The vertical line illustrates a CARW of 35%. The solid black 
horizontal line illustrates a microprudential leverage ratio of 3%, the dotted line additionally a cyclical 
macroprudential leverage ratio of 0.9% and the interrupted line additionally a structural macroprudential 
leverage ratio for systemically important institutions of 1.1%. 
Source: CNB. 
4.2 Vector Autoregression Model (VAR) 
A simple VAR model is used to analyse the effect of a change in the risk 
weight on the leverage ratio and to compare it with the effect of a change in risk 
weights on the capital ratio.23 Following Lutkepohl (2005), let’s assume an 
underlying structural model of an economy in the form: 
* *
1 1 ...t t p t p t   Ay A y A y ε , (11) 
                                                          
23 The number of lags was chosen so that the residuals were not correlated. No additional structural 
constraints were added to the models. All time series were seasonally adjusted and detrended. The 
VAR model does not display autocorrelation of residuals. 
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where y is a vector of K endogenous variables, ε is a vector of structural 
innovations and A and A are K K matrices of coefficients. We do not consider 
exogenous variables for the sake of simplicity, however, we do use them in the actual 
estimations. The variance covariance matrix of the structural innovations is assumed 
to be orthonormal. The underlying model is unknown. What is being estimated is the 
reduced form of previous equation: 
1 1 ...t t p t p tu   Ay A y A y , (12) 
where A are K K matrices of coefficients and u is a vector of innovations, 
which are not autocorrelated. The VAR must be stationary. The shocks contained in 
vector u have no direct interpretation. However, from tAy  and ty  it follows: 
1 *
j j
A A A , (13) 
u
  A A , (14) 
where   denotes a variance covariance matrix. Therefore, constraining the 
coefficients of matrix A yields a decomposition of the variance covariance matrix of 
the innovations of the reduced form system so that they can be related to the 
structural innovations. The coefficients of matrix A describe the contemporaneous 
relations between the endogenous variables. This is the so-called A-model. 
Regarding the assumption of orthonormal variance covariance matrix of structural 
innovations in
tAy , the matrix equation contains  1 / 2K K  independent equations. 
To obtain a unique solution for the 2K coefficients of matrix A , one needs to 
impose another  1 / 2K K   restrictions on A . Diagonal elements of matrix A are 
typically restricted to 1. This means that another  1 / 2K K  restrictions are needed. 
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Table 7 Structure of VAR models 
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VAR1 - 
large 
VAR2 - 
medium 
VAR3 - 
building 
VAR4 - 
large 
VAR5 - 
medium 
VAR6 - 
building 
cap_ratio cap_ratio cap_ratio lev_ratio lev_ratio lev_ratio 
lev_ratio lev_ratio lev_ratio rwa_ta rwa_ta rwa_ta 
rwa_ta rwa_ta rwa_ta og og og 
credit_ta credit_ta credit_ta rir rir rir 
- - - rer rer rer 
exogenous 
variables 
og_ea og_ea og_ea og_ea og_ea og_ea 
observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 
lags 2 2 2 2 2 2 
L
M
 t
e
s
t 
fo
r 
a
u
to
c
o
rr
e
la
ti
o
n
 (
1
 -
 5
 l
a
g
s
) 
32.39068 37.12116 19.95274 36.55065 29,714 28,934 
41.08340* 30.26335 19.83137 22.81781 29,156 25,374 
24.31843 35.60701 23.13772 40.15510** 35,005* 33,233 
32.60556 36.31026 19.81016 37.14035* 44,855*** 44,228** 
31.13786 26.30777 25.66992 19.28306 30,440 21,880 
Jarque-Bera 328.6582 122.8469 29.79896 3.789390 4,236 44,246*** 
White 254.7618 288.6576 251.4562 358.2308 355,102 334,924 
Notes: LM statistic is based on Lagrange multiplier test for autocorrelation under the null of no autocorrelation 
up to the given lag. Jarque-Bera is the Jarque-Bera statistic under the null of multivariate normal 
distribution (Cholesky decomposition used). White is the White statistic under the null of no 
heteroskedasticity. LR test statistic is based on comparison of log likelihood of the unrestricted model 
(null hypothesis) and restricted model (alternative hypothesis). (*, **, *** denote rejection of the null at 
10 %, 5 % and 1 % level of significance, respectively). cap_ratio = capital ratio; lev_ratio = leverage 
ratio; rwa_ta = risk weighted assets to assets; credit_ta = loans to assets; rir = real interest rate gap; rer 
= real exchange rate gap; og = output gap CZ; og_ea = output gap EA. 
Source: Compiled by authors. 
The relationship between the variables is illustrated using impulse response 
functions (IRFs), which express the response generated by an unexpected shock 
(impulse) to the current value and future values of the explained variables. We 
conducted a simulation with an analytical (asymptomatic) standard deviation 
response to obtain the responses to a shock to the endogenous variables in the 5% 
and 32% significance interval with a decomposition method based on generalised 
impulses, as described in more detail in Pesaran and Shin (1998). We constructed an 
orthogonal set of innovation independent of the variables’ ordering in VAR model. 
The IRFs are then computed by applying a variable specific Cholesky factor. 
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The analysis was conducted separately for each bank (without small banks)24 
type using the leverage and capital ratios, risk weights and ratio of loans and 
receivables to total assets (endogenous variables) and the output gap of the euro area 
economy (exogenous control variable).25 Table 7 shows the structure of the 
underlying VAR models. It gives information on the endogenous and exogenous 
variables used in each particular VAR. The estimations are based on 50 quarterly 
observations; 2 lags were mostly sufficient to get rid of autocorrelation in the 
residuals. Since the sample contains the global financial crisis, the additional 
robustness check is carried out by excluding the critical 2009 year to understand 
whether some of the reported findings are due to the global recession. Further on, we 
try adding a dummy variable that takes the value one during a financial crisis and 
zero otherwise. During both exercises, the impulse response functions have not been 
changed significantly in a sense of changing findings of the study. 
(i) Impact of risk weights on financial indicators 
The leverage ratio rose and the capital ratio fell as the risk weights increased 
(see Figure 6). Banks reacted to the growth in risks by topping up their capital, which 
led to an increase in the leverage ratio. However, the rise in capital was smaller than 
the rise in risk-weighted assets, so the capital ratio decreased. When the risk-
weighted assets decreased, by contrast, the capital ratio rose and the leverage ratio 
fell. This shows that the two capital tools are complementary. 
The response to a change in risk weights differed across bank types in the 
period under review (see Figure 6). The effect of a change in risk weights on the 
leverage ratio was particularly strong for medium-sized banks. It was insignificant 
for building societies, probably due to their specific business model and relatively 
stable risk weights. 
By contrast, the effect of a change in risk weights on the capital ratio was 
particularly significant for building societies. This can be explained by their low risk 
weights, which imply a lower capital requirement, i.e. a lower numerator in the 
capital ratio. An increase in its denominator, or risk-weighted assets, then causes a 
larger decline in the capital ratio. Conversely, an increase in the total capital ratio, for 
example in the form of the introduction of a macroprudential capital buffer, will not 
necessarily increase the capital requirement significantly in a situation of low risk 
weights. 
To sum up, the current decline in the risk weights of the individual bank types 
(see Figure 4) during the ongoing economic recovery is increasing the relevance of 
the introduction of the leverage ratio. 
  
                                                          
24 Changes in the volume of a capital of small banks are often specific because of the initial phase of the 
life cycle of many of them.  
25 Stationarity was ensured by converting the variables to year-on-year growth. 
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Figure 6 Effect of an increase in risk weights 
a) Effect of an increase in risk weights on the leverage ratio 
Large banks Medium-sized banks Building societies 
   
 
 
b) Effect of an increase in risk weights on the capital ratio 
Large banks Medium-sized banks Building societies 
   
Notes: The charts present the impulse responses. The x-axis shows the number of quarters after the shock 
and the y-axis the strength of the response to the shock generated as a single variance. The continuous 
line indicates the mean response and the blue fields show the confidence intervals at the 95% and 68% 
confidence levels. 
Source: CNB, authors' calculations. 
(ii) Impact of monetary conditions and real economy on financial 
indicators 
The resilience of banks is affected by internal processes as well by external 
environment. Therefore, we consider shocks to monetary and real economy 
conditions and their impact on the leverage ratio. The shocks are drawn from real 
interest rate gap (RIR), real exchange rate gap (RER) and output gap and can be 
interpreted as follows: unexpected increase in the RIR is viewed as restrictive 
monetary policy shock; an increase in RER represents currency appreciation shock 
and increase in positive output gap is a positive productivity shock. Impulse response 
functions are depicted in Figure 7. It should be noted that Czech banks had a large 
capital buffer and were relatively stable during analysed period, so they did not 
decrease much of their capital buffer. As a result, the impact of defined shocks was 
significant only for the medium-sized bank. In this group of banks were a few objects 
not as stable as the rest of the Czech financial sector. 
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Figure 7 Effect of a change in macroeconomic conditions  
a) Effect of an increase in RIR on the leverage ratio 
Large banks Medium-sized banks Building societies 
   
 
 
 
b) Effect of an increase in output gap on the leverage ratio 
Large banks Medium-sized banks Building societies 
   
 
 
c) Effect of an increase in RER (appreciation) on the leverage ratio 
Large banks Medium-sized banks Building societies 
   
Notes: The charts present the impulse responses. The x-axis shows the number of quarters after the shock 
and the y-axis the strength of the response to the shock generated as a single variance. The continuous 
line indicates the mean response and the blue fields show the confidence intervals at the 95% and 68% 
confidence levels. 
Source: CNB, authors' calculations. 
Higher interest rates as a result of monetary policy restriction will lead to 
lower credit activity. We would thus expect banks to increase the ratio of less risky 
assets in their portfolios which results in lower risk weights (this is well documented 
for the medium-sized banks in Figure 8b). When the risk-weighted assets decreased, 
the leverage ratio may be reduced (Figure 6a), due to the withdrawal of Tier capital. 
Higher interest rates may, therefore, reduce the leverage ratio. This behaviour is 
visible in Figure 7a, especially in medium-sized banks response. The reactions of 
large banks and building societies remained negligible. 
Similarly, the effect of exchange rate appreciation shocks was the most 
significant for medium-sized banks for which exchange rate differences constitute 
generally higher proportion of the total revenue. In this case, the exchange rate 
appreciation leads to a leverage ratio increase. Response for the large banks is not 
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significant. Based on information in Figure 8a, the level of risky assets reduces when 
hit by currency appreciation shock. 
The positive productivity shock is reflected in higher leverage ratio. The 
impact of defined shocks on capital ratio was not statistically significant in the entire 
sample and respective IRFs are not presented here.  Czech banking sector is well 
capitalized and remained profitable during the reporting period, the impulse response 
analysis of macroeconomic shocks confirmed this fact. 
Figure 8 Effect of an increase in risk weights 
a) Effect of an increase in RER on the RWA b) Effect of an increase in RIR on the RWA 
Large banks Medium-sized banks 
  
Notes: The charts present the impulse responses. The x-axis shows the number of quarters after the shock 
and the y-axis the strength of the response to the shock generated as a single variance. The continuous 
line indicates the mean response and the blue fields show the confidence intervals at the 95% and 68% 
confidence levels. 
Source: CNB, authors' calculations. 
5. Conclusion 
This article provided evidence of a complementary relationship between the 
leverage and capital ratios. Using a simple vector autoregression model, this 
relationship was documented on Czech data by showing the different responses of 
the two instruments to a change in the risk weight. Then, we conducted sensitivity 
scenarios of leverage ratio responses on changed monetary and macroeconomic 
conditions. The real exchange rate appreciation affected the most significantly the 
medium-sized banks. To the contrary, the real interest rate increase revealed strong 
negative impact on leverage ratio of medium-sized banks. The reactions of large 
banks and building societies remained negligible. The positive productivity shock is 
reflected in higher leverage ratio. Czech banking sector is well capitalized and 
remained profitable during the reporting period, the impulse response analysis of 
macroeconomic shocks confirmed this fact. 
The introduction of a microprudential leverage ratio increases banks’ 
resilience to less risky exposures. The setting of a macroprudential leverage ratio 
could also have a positive effect on macroprudential policy effectiveness in terms of 
mitigating cyclical and structural risks, especially if systemic risk arises at a time 
when risk weights are below the CARW for a large number of institutions with large 
market shares. To set the macroprudential leverage ratio, it may be appropriate to 
apply a fixed rule that keeps the CARW constant for all banks over time and hence 
also keeps the constraining effect of the two capital regulation tools stable and 
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predictable.  When the fixed rule is applied, the initial CARW level has a significant 
effect on the level of macroprudential leverage ratio. 
The VAR model estimates confirmed intuitive relationship between the risk 
weights and capital and leverage ratio. So the increase of the risk weights decreased 
the capital ratio and increased the leverage ratio by refilling capital subsequently in 
reaction to the risk shock. Effect varied among different bank types. The strongest 
effect of a change in risk weights on the capital ratio was observed at building 
societies, which revealed the lowest risk weight during whole period. 
Furthermore, we examined effect of change in macroeconomic conditions to 
leverage ratio. Czech bank sector has been well capitalized during entire period with 
safety capital surplus, therefore the impact of change in monetary conditions and real 
economy had significant response for medium-sized banks only. Higher real interest 
rates caused weaker credit activity and shifted bank portfolio to lower riskiness, 
which put up capital ratio inherently and allowed to reduce leverage ratio by holding 
less Tier capital. The real exchange rate appreciation of domestic currency improved 
leverage ratio of the medium-sized banks significantly, which might have been 
caused by relatively higher share of liabilities in foreign currencies. Decline of risk 
weights as a reaction to real exchange rate appreciation was visible for large banks. 
Output gap increase was accompanied rather by growth of leverage ratio due to 
favorable bank profitability development and vice versa, but the Czech banking 
sector remained resistant even in crisis.  
Continued decline in risk weights and a change in the balance-sheet structures 
of individual types of Czech banks towards less risky assets is increasing the 
relevance of the microprudential leverage ratio and subsequently also the 
macroprudential leverage ratio as a supplementary capital regulation tool. 
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